Military Law -- Retroactivity of the Service-Connection Test of the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial by Patterson, Lee Austin, II
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 50 | Number 2 Article 10
2-1-1972
Military Law -- Retroactivity of the Service-
Connection Test of the Jurisdiction of Courts-
Martial
Lee Austin Patterson II
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




extent and limits of such a doctrine can only be matters of speculation
at this time.
The reckless-disregard standard is very complex and may be diffi-
cult to apply.72 If the Supreme-Court decides many of these cases, the
complexity of the application of the standard combined with the necess-
ity for constitutional fact-finding may prove to be an unhappy burden
on an already greatly overworked Court. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the quality of the Court's work has already begun to suffer.73
In light of these considerations, perhaps Mr. Justice Harlan's desire to
formulate simple rules which can be easily and quickly applied without
pulling the Court so far into the fact-finding process can be appreciated.
KENNETH S. CANNADAY
Military Law-Retroactivity of the Service-Connection Test of the Juris-
diction of Courts-Martial
Throughout the history of the United States, the relationship of the
nation's military establishment to the civilian'government has been a
recurring problem. One facet of this relationship that has resulted in
significant tension concerns the proper division of jurisdiction between
the military and civilian courts. The determination of when a particular
defendant is subject to military jurisdiction is difficult because of the
inherent stress between constitutional guarantees in the application of
military justice.' Several constitutional provisions 2 and a myriad of fed-
eral statutes3 deal with the military's jurisdiction over its members. The
problem is complicated because these provisions are not always consist-
ent.4
The difference between the civilian and military systems of justice
lies in the denial to military personnel of some of the protections of the
"See note 43 supra.
"See Strong, The Time Has Come To Talk of a Major Curtailment in the Supreme Cori's
Jurisdiction, 48 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1969), and commentators cited therein.
'Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362 (1971).
'See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
'The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
UCMJ], sets out the general scheme of military justice.
'For example, until 1957 precisely how the Bill of Rights applies to servicemen was uncertain.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
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Bill of Rights.5 Although only the right to a grand jury indictment is
specifically denied to servicemen by the Constitution,6 the military trial
procedure that evolved in the early years of the United States was based
upon standards enacted by Congress under its article I power to make
laws to regulate and control the armed forces and not upon constitu-
-tional guarantees. 7 For example, pursuant to this authority Congress
formulated a system of military justice that excluded the right to trial
by jury.' The federal courts traditionally have been hesitant to involve
themselves in the developments of the system of military justice primar-
ily because of the differences in the constitutional sources of power of
the two systems.' Consequently, servicemen are allowed to move from
the military to the civilian courts only through a petition for habeas
corpus'0 and only after the exhaustion of all military remedies."
5See Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1, 27-36 (1958). But see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1957).
'U.S. CONST. amend V.
7U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army, 13
VAND. L. REv. 435, 445-53 (1960).
5UCMJ art. 22-29, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-29 (1970).
9Military courts are said to draw their authority from article I rather than article i or the
Constitution. Comment, Civilian Court Review of Court-Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUI, L.
REV. 1259, 1274 (1969). The limited power of the civilian courts to review mi';tary affairs was
recognized as early as 1858. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858). More recent cases
have demonstrated the continuing deference of the civilian courts to the military courts. See, e.g.,
Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583, 584 (1956); Swisher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 921, 928
(W.D. Mo. 1965) aff'd., 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966). The UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970)
states that all court-martial decisions following appeal within the military process are "final and
conclusive."
"0See UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970). The civilian courts may receive military eases
only by a petition for habeas corpus. This petition must allege a failure of military jurisdiction, a
defect in the composition of the court-martial, or a defect in the sentencing procedure. Wurfel,
Military Habeas Corpus 11, 49 MICH. L. REV. 699, 713 (1951). Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
reh. denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953), allows habeas corpus review of military decisions that fail to give
"full and fair consideration" to the assertion of a constitutional right by the defendant. The history
of the military appellate procedure demonstrates, however, that such rights are virtually always
accorded the "full and fair consideration" required. Between 1953 and 1965 the federal courts did
not grant a single petition for habeas corpus based on failure of "full and fair consideration" in
the military system. Comment, 69 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 9, at 1265. However, some recent
cases may portend an expansion in the scope of review on habeas corpus by civilian courts of court-
martial decisions. For example, in Allen v. VanCantfort, 446 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971), noted in
50 N.C.L. REV. 173 (1971), it was held that federal district courts must review allegations of
UCMJ statutory error. For a recent interpretation of the scope of review by the civilian courts, see
Everett, CollateralAttacks on Court-Martial Convictions, II JAG L. REV. 399 (1969).
"Everett, supra note 10, at 399 & 401 n.16.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL
It was on such a petition in O'Callahan v. Parker12 that the Su-
preme Court rejected the military status of the defendant as the jurisdic-
tional test of military courts and adopted in its place the "service-
connection" of the crime as the proper jurisdictional test.)3 The Court
indicated that unless the crime was service-connected, the defendant
could be tried only in civlian courts. However, the opinion was silent as
to the possible retroactive application of its principle. Following a year
and a half of attempts by lower courts to put legalistic flesh on the
jurisdictional skeleton of O'Callahan," the Supreme Court in Relford
v. Commandant 5 granted certiorari 6 to Corporal Isiah Relford's peti-
tion for habeas corpus to discuss the "scope and retroactivity of
O'Callahan." Because it decided that Relford's crimes were service-
connected, the Court sustained the military's jurisdiction to try him.
More importantly, this outcome negated the necessity to consider the
issue of the retroactivity of the O'Callahan decision. 7
The issue of the retroactive application of O'Callahan is a problem
of significant magnitude in both the military and civilian court systems.
A retroactive application of the service-connection test would affect
hundreds of thousands of servicemen and ex-servicemen tried by' military
courts. 8 It could disturb convictions dating from 1916'9 and affect possi-
'395 U.S. 258 (1969).
'3Id. at 272.
"E.g., Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Mercer v. Dillon, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970); United States v. King, 40 C.M.R. 1030 (1969).
4 40I U.S. 355 (1971).
1397 U.S. 934 (1970).
11401 U.S. at 369.
'"Brief for Respondent at 28, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). The administra-
tive effect of complete retroactive application of O'Callahan could indeed be staggering. The Judge
Advocate General of the United States Army estimates that over 1,300,000 men have been court-
martialed in the Army alone since 1951 and that as many as one third of those convictions could
be overturned. Id. Another estimate sets the number at over 4,000,000 courts-martial in the Army
alone since 1917. Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904, 908 (M.D. Pa. 1970). One court observed
that the Army, Navy, and Air Force conducted approximately 74,000 courts-martial in fiscal 1968.
Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 268, 41 C.M.R. 264, 268 (1970). The problem would be
complicated by staleness of the record in many instances and the impossibility of gathering wit-
nesses and evidence for de novo trials. Brief for Respondent at 29, Relford v. Commandant, 401
U.S. 355 (1971). See Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civil-
ian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1, 44 (1969). These
problems militate against a retroactive application of O'Callahan and persuaded the Court of
Military Appeals in Mercer and two district courts, see note 23 infra., to apply O'Callahan
prospectively only.
"In 1916 Congress passed the Articles of War, which extended military jurisdiction to non-
capital civilian crimes committed in peacetime by servicemen. Duke & Vogel, supra note 7, at 451.
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bly as many as 450,000 petitions for restoration of rank, pay, or benefits
and as many as four thousand petitions for release from federal cus-
tody.20
Although Relford failed to solve the dilemma as to whether the
service-connection test is to be applied retroactively, the opinion ap-
peared to invite another case in which retroactivity would be "solely
dispositive. ' ' 21 However, while the Supreme Court awaits another case
to work its way through the military system, lower courts are faced with
immediate demands for retroactive application of O'Callahan.
The Court of Military Appeals, in Mercer v. Dillon,2 - held that
O'Callahan would not apply to cases finalized before June 21, 1969, the
date of the O'Callahan decision.Y The Mercer court refused to apply
O'Callahan retroactively for two reasons. First, it stated that
O'Callahan was not a jurisdictional decision at all but instead was con-
cerned only with the denial of the procedural due process rights to a jury
trial and a grand jury indictment. 2' The court's second ground was that
O'Callahan did not rule on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
of the military courts but rather limited the exercise of that jurisdiction
to crimes that are service-connected.2
The principle reason advanced for denying retroactive effect to
O'Callahan was that O'Callahan was concerned primarily with the de-
nial of the defendant's procedural guarantees and not with the jurisdic-
tion of a military court to try him. It was argued that the contention
that O'Callahan was grounded in jurisdiction is "merely playing with
words, and ignores both the rationale . . . and the realistic issue in the
case." 2 Thus the issue was said to be simply whether a new trial should
be given to those already tried. Under this argument the retroactivity
issue would be decided according to the criteria laid down by the Su-
preme Court when ruling on the retroactive effect of decisions which
granted procedural due process rights. Thus, the measure of "reliance
2Brief for Respondent at 28, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
21401 U.S. at 370.
-19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970).
'Two district courts have ruled that O'Callahan would be applied only prospectively. See
Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Gosa v. Mayden, 305 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D.
Fla. 1969). One court of appeals distinguished O'Callahan on its facts and on the authority of
Relford did not reach the retroactivity issue. Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322 (l0th Cir. 1971).
2419 U.S.C.M.A. at 264-68,41 C.M.R. at 264-68.
211d.
2Brief for Respondent at 31, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and the effect on
the administration of justice that the new standards"27 would likely have
led the Mercer court to deny retroactive effect to O'Callahan.
Evidently the Mercer court felt that in O'Callahan the Supreme
Court did not mean "jurisdiction" when it said "jurisdiction. 28 The
Mercer court stated that the O'Callahan Court had been concerned with
the "individual's particular rights in a trial rather than the power of the
court-martial to judge him. '29 To assess the validity of this argument it
is necessary to consider the nature and extent of military jurisdiction.
The military courts are largely creatures of statute. Thus, they
exercise only the limited jurisdiction granted by Congress pursuant to
its article I power" to establish rules for military courts.3 Prior to the
decision in O'Callahan, it was clear that the military had jurisdiction
to try any criminal case in which a serviceman was the defendant.
32
Moreover, the Supreme Court had not overruled the military court's
exercise of jurisdiction in this area. However, the O'Callahan decision
held that the military courts had not been granted the power to exercise
jurisdiction over servicemen for crimes not "service-connected." Much
of the O'Callahan opinion was devoted to a justification in terms of due
process of its holding, and thus it is not clear from the opinion that the
Court relied solely upon jurisdictional doctrine. O'Callahan asserted his
right to a civilian trial not because the military court failed to try him
by an impartial jury but because in this instance the military had no
jurisdiction to try him at all.3 3 Thus, while it may be true that the lack
"Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 266, 41 C.M.R. 264, 266. These tests are laid out in
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). See also DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
For the Supreme Court's rationale against retroactive application, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965).
21n at least one instance the Court has said "jurisdiction" when it did not mean "jurisdic-
tion." See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968). In Avco the Court
declared that its statement in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) that a
complaint was being dismissed "for lack of jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act" had
really been intended to mean "only that the Federal District Court lacked the general equity power
to grant the particular relief." 390 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
"19 U.S.C.M.A. at 272,41 C.M.R. at 272 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
3'See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 34 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
"See, e.g., Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583, 584 (1956); Swisher v. United States, 237 F.
Supp. 921,928 (W.D. Mo. 1965) affd, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966).
32W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE 38-40 (1955).
3395 U.S. at 272.
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of procedural guarantees precipitated O'Callahan's claim, it was the
question of a lack of military jurisdiction that afforded the Court the
opportunity to grant relief. It therefore seems that the O'Callahan deci-
sion turned primarily on whether the defendant was subject to military
jurisdiction. That question being resolved negatively, it incidentally fol-
lowed that he was to be accorded the procedural guarantees of the
Constitution. Arguably, then, the criteria for determining the retroactiv-
ity of decisions according procedural rights should not apply to the
O'Callahan situation.
The Mercer court's second ground for denying retroactive effect to
O'Callahan was that "O'Callahan did not rule on the existence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, [but rather] limited the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion . . . ."3 The Mercer majority found authority for this view in an
earlier decision by the Air Force Court of Military Review.3" That deci-
sion held that the military does have jurisdiction to try military members
for criminal misconduct sanctioned by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and that O'Callahan "merely withholds the exercise of jurisdic-
tion"36 over offenses that are not service-connected. However, after ex-
pressing this view of O'Callahan, the Court of Military Review
grounded its decision in the same procedural and administrative consid-
erations applied by the Supreme Court in its procedural due process
decisions. 37
O'Callahan neither suggested a difference between jurisdiction and
the exercise of jurisdiction nor spoke in terms of abstention by military
courts. If O'Callahan merely ordered the military courts to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction, by analogy to the present general rule respecting
abstention by federal courts to permit decision by state courts, the mili-
tary courts would be able to reassume and exercise their jurisdiction if
the non-military courts failed to act or acted outside the limits of the
Constitution. 3 However the language of O'Callahan clearly forbids any
exercise of military jurisdiction over non-service-connected crimes. The
Court laid down a mandate in terms of jurisdiction but justified and
u19 U.S.C.M.A. at 265, 41 C.M.R. at 265. See also United States v. King, 40 C.M.R. 1030,
1035 (1969).
-1United States v. King, 40 C.M.R. 1030 (1969).
uId. at 1035.
1id. at 1034-35.
UWRIGHT, § 52, at 198 & n.20. There are limited instances in which the federal courts have
been ordered to abstain completely and forfeit all original jurisdiction to state courts. Id. at 199.
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explained it in terms of procedural due process quarantees. This has
opened the possibility for the lower courts to latch onto one or the other
of these theories to determine the retroactivity issue. The legal and verbal
gymnastics of the Mercer court and the Air Force Board of Review
evidence concern in military circles regarding the overwhelming deluge
of collateral attacks against convictions that will result if O'Callahan is
applied retroactively.
The specific wording of the O'Callahan opinion adds some credence
to the belief that the decision was not jurisdictional and therefore should
be denied retroactive effect. The O'Callahan Court appeared to suggest
that the military system of justice is in need of procedural reform be-
cause it is "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitu-
tional law." 39 By focusing upon the procedural deficiencies "lurking in
military trials"4 instead of upon the military's lack of jurisdiction to
try O'Callahan, the Court did not unmistakably ground its decision in
jurisdiction.
There is some authority for the proposition that O'Callahan should
be applied retroactively. The dissent in Mercer felt that "[w]here juris-
diction is lacking there can be no question of prospective or retrospective
application, for where a court-martial proceeds without jurisdiction, its
action is null and void."'" The Mercer dissent concluded that the court
should be "concerned not with an individual's particular rights in a trial,
but the power of the court-martial to judge him. O'Callahan .. .
teaches clearly that such power is lacking .... -"2 A New York federal
district court in Flemings v. Chafee13 arguing from the same viewpoint,
added that it would observe the "traditional rule" and allow retroactive
effect unless specifically told not to do so by the Supreme Court.4
Both Flemings15 and the Mercer dissent46 expressed the belief that
the retroactivity issue was mooted by a prior determination of a lack of
jurisdiction. This view has been concurred in by the author of the Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1968, Senator Sam J. Ervin. Senator Ervin feels that
11395 U.S. at 265.
JGld.
"19 U.S.C.M.A. at 271, 41 C.M.R. at 271 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
121d. at 273, C.M.R. at 273.
43330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Id. at 197.
51d. at 199.
1119 U.S.C.M.A. at 272,41 C.M.R. at 272.
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the effect of O'Callahan was to decide that the military never had the
power to try a soldier's non-military crimes and that such convictions
are invalid.
47
When the dust of the battle of semantics settles, the ultimate deci-
sion to be made is whether the tremendous administrative burdens that
would be caused by retroactive application will outweigh the traditional
requirement that before the defendant can be legally convicted the court
must be one of competent jurisdiction. 8 The retroactivity question arose
because of the ambiguities of the O'Cllahan opinion. The question was
left unanswered by the Supreme Couft in Relford. The lower courts are
already in conflict on the question, and it will not be definitively an-
swered until the Supreme Court decides the retroactivity of
O'Callahan.49 It is vital that the Court do so and restore the certainty
of jurisdiction that is essential to all criminal justice.
LEE AUSTIN PATTERSON II
Torts-Negligence-The Substitute Birth Control Pill
By the turn of the 19th century Thomas Malthus and his disciples
were predicting dire consequences for a world rapidly proving too small
for its fertile population.1 These fears are ardently espoused in the 20th
century as well by zero population societies urgently crying, "make love
not babies-ban the population bomb."12 With the advent of sophisti-
cated and successful birth control techniques the ills of overpopulation
might someday be realistically avoided. Meanwhile, social mores are
undergoing change and the law is being challenged to keep pace by re-
examining traditional- concepts in light of these changes. One such con-
cept is the benefits-of-the-healthy-child rule, which proclaims that the
event of childbirth and the happiness of rearing a child always outweigh
the financial liability,3 Recently a Michigan Court of Appeals took issue
with this concept.
17See Note, Denial of Military Jurisdiction Over Servicemen's Crimes Having No Military
Significance and Cognizable in Civilian Courts, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 930, 938 (1970).
4 WRIGHT § 53, at 211.
"See 401 U.S. at 370.
1R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 58-84 (2d rev. ed. 1963).
'Friedrich, Population Explosion: Is Man Really Doomed?, TuNE, Sept. 13, 1971, at 58-59.
346 N.C.L. REv. 948, 949 (1968).
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